m. Source of Fishy, Shaggy Dog Stories That Derailed Public Understanding Of Investigation Pleads Fifth While His Daughter Represents Al-Timimi Pro Bono In early August 2002, the head of the District of Columbia Field Office initiated a leak investigation related to Amerithrax information. The first leak investigation concerned leak of bloodhound story to Newsweek (according to email discussed in deposition of lead prosecutor Daniel Seikaly in which he repeatedly pled the Fifth Amendment). A memo from DC Field Office head Van Harp read: TO: OPR
NSD
From: Washington Field
ADIC's Office: Harp Van A (202) xxx-xxxx
***
Title: UNSUB
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE AND/OR
MEDIA LEAK IN CONNECTION WITH THE
AMERITHRAX INVESTIGATION
***
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
The appearance of this information in the media affects the conduct of this investigation as well as the morale of the dedicated personnel who have expended enormous energy and effort on this investigation.
As such, I am requesting that either a media leak or OPR investigation be initiated. In the event a leak investigation is initiated then the enclosed LRM should be hand delivered to AAG Chertoff. [REDACTED]
The investigation was closed in October 2002. The memo read: Date: October 8, 2002
To: Mr. H. Marshall Jarrett
Counsel
Office of Professional Responsibility
United States Department of Justice
From: David W. Szady
Assistant Director
Counterintelligence Division
Subject: [REDACTED[
The purpose of this memorandum is to notify your office of the closing of the FBI's criminal investigation of the captioned media leak matter. It is the understanding of the FBI that your continUed investigation of this matter will be pursued by your office.
[REDACTED]
***
After a January 9, 2003 "exclusive" report by ABC's Brian Ross that the FBI was focusing on Hatfill and was going to conduct a second round of interviews with other former and current government scientists so that they might rule them out by the process of elimination, the FBI initiated a second media leak investigation. This time it was to proceed with "extreme zeal." The memo read:
Precedence: PRIORITY Date: 1/13/2003
To: Director's Office
Washington Field
From: Washington Field
Contact Richard L. Lambert 202-xxx-xxxx
Approved by: Harp Van
Lambert Richard L
Title: AMERITHRAX
MAJOR CASE 184
00: WFO
Synopsis: To request the opening of new OPR media leak investigation regarding captioned case.
[large redacted passages]
To demonstrate the seriousness with which the FBI views this matter, it is requested that the OPR inquiry commence with an interview of IIC Rick Lambert who will waive all Fifth Amendment privileges and accede to a voluntary polygraph examination to set a tone of candor, forthrightness and cooperation.
[redacted]
The instant matter is the second unauthorized media disclosure to occur in this investigation. Its potential detriment to the effective prosecution of the case is substantial. Accordingly, in the interests of both specific and general deterrence, the Inspector in Charge requests that this OPR inquiry be pursued with unprecedent zeal."
A June 2003 email then shut the barn door long after the horse had left the barn door:
From: DEBRA WEIERMAN
To: Lisa Hodgson
Date: Wed, June 4, 2003 12:18 PM
Subject: AMERITHRAX INVESTIGATION
Lisa: Please disseminate to all WFO employees. Thanks, Debbie
For the information of all recipients, Director Mueller has ordered that no one discuss the AMERITHRAX case with any representative of the news media. The WFO and Baltimore Media Offices have released several media advisories, which were coordinated with the US Attorney and FBIHQ, to explain specific milestones in the case. However, NO FBI WFO EMPLOYEE, INCLUDING MYSELF AND INSPECTOR RICK LAMBERT, WHO IS IN CHARGE OF AMERITHRAX, IS TO RESPOND TO ANY MEDIA INQUIRIES, THE ONLY EXCEPTION IS DEBBIE WEIERMAN IN THE MEDIA OFFICE. All inquiries from reporters or journalists received by any WFO employee are to be immediately referred to Debbie at xxx-xxxx, and she will handle.
I thank everyone at WFO for their dedication to the job and to this office. I also thank you for your cooperation in this very important matter.
Mike Rolince
In October 2007, the former Criminal Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, Daniel Seikaly, was deposed in the civil rights action by Steve Hatfill about whether he was the source of leaks relating to Steve Hatfill in connection the use of bloodhounds in the anthrax investigation and the draining of ponds in Frederick, Maryland. Key stories appeared in Newsweek and Washington Post. Attorney Seikaly pled the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination in connection with most substantive questions. Attorney Seikaly has had a very distinguished career. In 2001, Mr. Seikaly went from being Assistant Inspector General for Investigations at the Central Intelligence Agency to Criminal Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. There he supervised eighty-five Assistant United States Attorneys involved in the prosecution of all federal offenses in the District of Columbia. He also served as a technical expert for U.S. Department of State funded rule of law programs in Croatia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, and Thailand. Before accepting the appointment to Criminal Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, Mr. Seikaly was Assistant Inspector General for Investigations at the Central Intelligence Agency. While with the CIA, a profile at his current law firm’s webpage explains, “he conducted and supervised numerous investigations concerning allegations of misconduct by employees, contractors and vendors involved in CIA programs. In that position, he routinely interacted with senior officials within the intelligence community, other executive branch agencies and Congress concerning intelligence investigations.” The profile continues: “From 1996 to 1998, Daniel served as an Associate Deputy Attorney General at the Department of Justice and was Director of the Department’s Executive Office for National Security. There he was responsible for the coordination and oversight of the national security activities of the Department of Justice, including intelligence operations, international law enforcement, relations with foreign countries and the use of classified information. Reporting directly to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General and acting with their authority in national security matters, Daniel was a primary point of contact between the Department of Justice and other executive branch agencies with national security interests such as the National Security Council, the Department of State and the Department of Defense.” Here are some excerpts from the deposition: “Q. É calls this article, quote ‘An exclusive look at the search for the perpetrator of America’s worst bioterror attack.” Did you tell Mr. Klaidman [of Newsweek] that you were giving him an exclusive on this information?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. Did you tell Mr. Klaidman that the FBI was acting on a tip when it searched the pond in Frederick?
É
Q. Did you tell Mr. Klaidman that FBI agents had interviewed the acquaintance of Dr. Hatfill’s that was supposedly the tipster?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. Did you tell Mr. Klaidman that the acquaintance had told the FBI that Dr. Hatfill said toxic bacteria could be made in the woods and the evidence could be tossed in the lake?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. Did you tell Mr. Klaidman that the FBI might drain the entire pond the month after this report?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
[Lawyer defending deposition] Mark, let me say something on the record so we all understand the assertion because the manner in which — or the type of questions you’re asking here. My client has been instructed to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege regardless of whether or not the answer to the question would be yes or no, because even if the answer were to be no, if he answered no to certain questions, I think an inference could be drawn from that as to what he does or doesn’t know.
So I just want to make sure you understand in terms of our Fifth Amendment assertion here is that he’s asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege to questions that may have a yes or no answer, and it’s not fair to assume that the answer to every one of these questions would be yes or no if he were to answer the questions. Does that make sense?
Q. It makes sense, but we will be seeking an adverse inference as to all questions where the fifth amendment is taken.
***
Q. Mr. Seikaly, do you deny any of the statements attributed to you by Mr. Klaidman with respect to the [Newsweek bloodhound story]
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q Is it actually even true whether the search of the pond was prompted by a tip?
Q. Are you aware of any information that might have been used as a predicate for the pond search having been obtained as the fruits of electronic surveillance?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q Did you tell Mr. Klaidman that agents might be looking for a wet suit that could have been used to dispose of — that could have been used and disposed of by the anthrax attacker?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q. Did you give Allan Lengel of The Washington Post any information reflected in this article?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. Mr. Lengel has testified that you told him the FBI search of the pond in Frederick was tied to Steven Hatfill and that it was triggered by a hypothetical statement Dr. Hatfill has made about anthrax; is that correct?
A. That Mr. Lengel testified about that?
Q. Is it correct that you told Mr. Lengel about those things?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. How did you know that the FBI’s search of the pond in Frederick was tied to Steven Hatfill?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q. Why did you decide to disclose information to Mr. Lengel about the pond search?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q Did you tell Mr. Lengel that the items recovered from the pond up to that point included a clear box with holes that could accommodate gloves?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q Did you tell Mr. Lengel that the items recovered from the pond up that point included vials wrapped in plastic?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. Do you specifically deny making any statement that Mr. Lengel has attributed to you?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q. How did you know that tests for the presence of anthrax bacteria on the equipment were continuing after two rounds of tests produced conflicting results?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
Q. Why did you disclose that information to Mr. Lengel?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q Did you tell Mr. Lengel that the search of the pond in Frederick netted nothing but a hodgepodge of items that did not appear to be linked to the case?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q If we take the dates from Exhibits É, it appears that you disclosed investigative information to Mr. Lengel for articles that appeared in January 2003, May 2003, June 2003 and August 2003. Is that right?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
***
Q. É Do you know whether you ever saw this e-mail before?
A. I don’t believe I have.
Q. Okay. Let’s look at the partially redacted paragraph. It says, quote, “WFO [Washington Field Office] has opened a leak investigation in an attempt to find out who spoke to Newsweek Magazine over the weekend about the bureau’s use of bloodhounds in the anthrax investigation,” closed quote. Do you see that?
A. I do.
Q. And the date of the email is August 5th, 2002.
A. That’s correct.
Q. The investigation that’s referenced here is about the story that you gave Mr. Klaidman, is it not?
A. Assert my Fifth Amendment Privilege in response.
***
Q. Okay. In the bottom e-mail, when Blier begins, “here is a summary of my conversation with Glen about the anthrax leak investigation.” Now, Bill Blier worked for you, did he not?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you know what Mr. Blier was referring to when he referred to, quote, the anthrax leak investigation?
A. I believe that it was an investigation involving the possible compromise of classified information is my understanding. I did know about an investigation in that.
***
Q And do you know whether that had anything to do with bloodhounds or Newsweek?
A I don’t believe it did but I don’t know.
***
Q You were aware of an anthrax investigation, yes?
A. I was — I was aware that there was a discussion of an investigation involving the compromise of classified information arising from the anthrax investigation, the Amerithrax investigation. I do recall knowing that we were — we and the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Justice Department were concerned about this and were seeking to find out who compromised the classified information.
***
Q. Did you think it remarkable in any way that bloodhounds could track a scent from anthrax letters that were ten months old to a Denny’s in Louisiana where someone had eaten the day before?
[deponent invokes Fifth Amendment]
His daughter has represented Ali Al-Timimi pro bono in defense of his prosecution for sedition. My preference would be that former USA Today reporter Toni Locy, found in contempt by a District Court judge in the Hatfill civil rights action, just end the circus by confirming that her source was (if it was) the head of the criminal division in the District of Columbia, Dan Seikaly, who repeatedly pled the Fifth on the general subject at civil deposition. He had consented to being named by the reporters who contacted him and asked for a waiver of confidentiality. If he is the source, Ms. Locy’s refusal to more promptly contact her sources might be much ado about nothing. Based on her description in in her second deposition, Ms. Locy made only what seemed a half-hearted effort to contact a third and fourth source to ask for a waiver of confidentiality before her deposition (when that was the entire purpose of the second deposition). At her second deposition, she said: “I don’t know. I’ve just begun the process of reaching out to people.” She said that she had not spoken to Mr. Seikaly since her last deposition. No one disputes, for example, in connection with the pond draining story that the Maryland ponds were in fact drained. Her article reports that one official said that they were just looking to avoid criticism in the future that they had not aggressively pursued all theories. One person of interest as the third federal law enforcement source is the Criminal Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia who pled the Fifth Amendment on these issues at deposition. Was he Ms. Locy’s third “federal law enforcement source” on the subject? (The prosecutor providing the information about the pond draining had released two other reporters, when asked, from a promise of confidentiality, out of fairness to them). Another article she wrote titled “Anthrax Investigators tail scientist 24/7? states that the sources “requested anonymity because the anthrax probe is active.” That article refers to “four law enforcement sources.” It claims that Dr. Hatfill’s response to questioning in a polygraph on the subject of the attacks was “evasive.” Polygraph results are inadmissible in federal court and almost all state courts because they are deemed unreliable. If the report was that the alleged witch drowned upon being dunked, should we be so quick to protect the source of the report? What if it turns out that the leak was from the lawyer who would not be able to admit the claimed polygraph finding in court? The USA article concluded: “One of the law enforcement sources says investigators sometimes wonder whether they focused on Hatfill too soon and ignored someone who deserved more attention. So much has gone into investigating Hatfill, the source says, that abandoning the focus on him ‘would be like starting all over.’ ” The press has been so focused in defending itself from the charge that it was unfair to Dr. Hatfill — and law enforcement officials have been so chastened by the civil rights suit brought by Dr. Hatfill — that five years ago there stopped being meaningful coverage of Amerithrax by the mainstream press altogether. Given that it seems the press nowadays only ever has the budget to take spin handed under the table to them by government officials anyway, perhaps the First Amendment is not as worth prioritizing, in the balance of competing interests, as it used to be. Maybe we would learn more if Dr. Hatfill were allowed a meaningful day in court and then bloggers uploaded the transcript. The wisdom of the fictional City Desk Editor at the Baltimore Sun on the HBO’s series “Wired” in parsing out such First Amendment issues involving competing considerations — and that of Professor Archibald Cox — will be sorely missed. n. A Wiretap Balancing Act: The New Legal Regime That The White House Forgot To Tell The FISA Judges About There was a November 2007 filing unsealed today in the prosecution of Dr. Al-Timimi that discusses the USG's suspicion of him regarding anthrax weapons. It copies the counsel of record who is the daughter of the Amerithrax prosecutor who was hyping the "POI" of the other Amerithrax squad. "After this case was remanded for the specific purpose of allowing a review of withheld evidence collected under the NSA domestic surveilance program or any other undisclosed program, the government delayed consideration of withheld evidence until counsel received security clearances. Once security clearances were activated, however, the government refused to allow the counsel to review a single piece of withheld evidence or any of the in camera submissions to the Court -- not even redacted or summary versions of the evidence or in camera submissions."
***
"Despite repeated requests for an explanation from the government of why counsel cannot have access to material or review redacted or summary copies, the case has devolved into little more than a private conversation between the Court and shadow counsel."
"The Court should reject the current posture of secrecy as preposterous and abusive. The government should have cleared counsel of record making these motions. The government should also explain why opposing counsel cannot have access under traditional classification rules or receive redacted or summary versions of these documents."
Dr. Al-Timimi's counsel continued:
"In his discovery letter, Dr. Al-Timimi, by counsel, gave the government a detailed request covering a limited number of individuals. Besides material on him and obvious members of the "Virginia Jihad" associated by the government with the Dar Al-Arqam Islamic Center, Dr. Al-Timimi requested material related to only eight individuals ***
***
"The government's prior position was that any statements recollected or recorded by Dr. Al-Timimi on peace or war or Islamic duties were material. Thus, whether he was quoted or recorded on subjects of his views of religion or the United States, such statements were relevant to the question of whether "Timimi counseled and induced his followers to support terrorist groups that sought to destroy America."
***
"The government concedes that any interceptions of Dr. Al-Timimi would have to be disclosed, but insists that it has done so. It, however, limits this representation to "all communications in which he was a party that were intercepted by the NSA. *** There is every reason to believe that he was subject to interceptions given the government statements that it long suspected him of ties to Al Qaeda and bin Laden as well as his numerous international calls from inside and outside the country. [redacted passages, presumptively IMO about Amerithrax investigation] At trial, FBI Agent John Wyman testified that "the investigation were conducting, we know of extensive ties between Timimi, Hawaali, and other elements of the broader Al Qaeda network." Wyman Transcript at 1172.
By order dated March 13, 2008, District Court Judge Leonie M. Brinkema gave the government an additional 60 days to complete the process of looking for discoverable material as to any NSA wiretapping of Ali Al-Timimi. The government made two filings the week earlier. One was an Ex Parte, In Camera, Classified Status Report as to Ali Timimi which was filed with the court security officer. The other was a very brief unclassified status report regarding discovery related to the National Security Agency. That filing was to the effect that the government had not yet found anything discoverable but that counsel was continuing to look. In a January 2006 interview, Ali Al-Timimi’s counsel explained why the defense wants any such intercepts: Dr. Al-Timimi insisted that the intercepts submitted by the government were wildly misleading, and he sought any intercepts that the government had, because he insisted that he has repeatedly opposed violence and repeatedly called for moderation. What the government said here was, “No. There’s no further evidence. There’s no other intercepts.” Professor Turley explained: “Most independent observers believe that Dr. Al-Timimi was a very likely subject or target of the operation. He was involved in a great number of international calls to countries that were targeted by this operation and the government has said that it suspected him, although it never really did show connections to al Qaeda. If indeed, as many believe, Dr. Al-Timimi was a target of the operation, it means that the government misled the trial court. It can withhold evidence. It can say, ‘We don’t believe this evidence should be allowed into trial,’ but it has to honestly answer the court when it’s asked if there are other intercepts in the government’s possession.” Turley said in an earlier interview. “It’s possible that prosecutors had no idea of the origin of this evidence.” Former WTC 1993 prosecutor Andrew McCarthy has noted, "When, moreover, there is any dispute about whether a sensitive piece of information needs to be disclosed, the decision ends up being made by a judge on the basis of what a fair trial requires rather than by the executive branch on the basis of what public safety demands." McCarthy explained in connection with the earlier prosecution relating to the bombing of the World Trade Center: ”Much of the CIA’s knowledge, particularly that drawn from its covert operations, is top-secret intelligence. When an Agency analyst gives the kind of briefing I needed on Afghanistan, it is certain to be based on at least some classified information, including intelligence from deep-cover operatives, from foreign countries, and from electronic surveillance the CIA was lucky enough to set up on just the right telephone or meeting place. Such intelligence is sometimes confined to a circle so tight its revelation would blow its source." Carl W. Tobias, a law professor at the University of Richmond, told The New York Times that a question of balance would be central in how judges rule on the scope of the spying program. “I would expect the government to say that it is highly sensitive material, but we have legal mechanisms to balance the national security needs with the rights of defendants,” Tobias told the Times. “I think judges are very conscientious about trying to sort out these issues and balance civil liberties and national security.” o. Nano Is Now: Microencapsulation of the Matter In December 2001, the CIA obtained the record of a request by Ayman Zawahiri to Al Qaeda’s military commander, Egyptian Mohammed Atef, for a book that extensively featured Dr. Ken Alibek and discussed the method of microencapsulation, the method used to weaponize the Daschle and Leahy anthrax. As Professor Turley at GWU, who represents “anthrax weapons suspect” Al-Timimi infers, the FBI and CIA very likely were enthused at the prospect of continuing a FISA warrant on Ali Al-Timimi’s phone and email to pursue this lead. According to Ali’s lawyer, he was in contact with folks associated with Al Qaeda’s network including Bin Laden’s sheik (the subject of Bin Laden’s 1996 declaration of war) immediately before and after the first anthrax mailing. According to his lawyer, Ali even met with the “911 imam” to discuss a planned hand delivery of a warning to every member of Congress on the first anniversary of the anthrax letters to the Senators. Now when Ali would go to London to lecture at JIMAS (such as in the Summer of 1996 and 2001), was he also in touch with Abu Musab al-Suri? Al-Suri, now captured, was in touch with Zawahiri and reportedly worked with Midhat Mursi on poisons. The red headed al-Suri had located his London front not from Ayman’s friends who led the London cell and then were detained in 1998 after they faxed claim of responsibility for the 1998 embassy bombings in which a couple hundred died. (Abdel-Bari is subject to extradition as is Al-Sirri, who was working closely with the blind sheik’s liasion, Postal employee Abdel Sattar.) The London-based redheaded Al-Suri posted instructions purporting to explain how to weaponize plague. Although he was a propagandist, not a microbiologist, didn’t he know fellow propagandist, microbiologist Ali Al-Timimi, who came to London to lecture about ideological differences that divided the salafi-jihadis there? The book that Ayman asked Atef to get (and it is sold by Amazon) explains: “This coating process - called microencapsulation - is also considered evidence of possible Soviet assistance, since only the Soviets and Americans (before 1969) managed to coat...” The authors interviewed both Dr. Alibek and Dr. Bailey (and specifically acknowledged their help). The authors explained:
“Dr. Malcolm Dando, the distinguished biologist and Professor of International Security at the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, Englad, talks of microencapsulation, a process by which BW agents can be coated and protected against a variety of harmful outside factors... This process also allows agents to survive longer and to be inhaled more easily, which increases the likeihood of infection and death. Currently, the detection and identification of microencapsulated BW agents is more difficult than for non-encapsulated materials. The Soviets crossed this scientific threshold years ago and were able to ‘spray’ their bacterial and viral agents that were resistant to the sun’s rays.)”
They continued: “In fact, microencapsulation can already be tailored for the mission. For example, you can apply one coating for added protection from heat, and then another one for the effects of sunlight. A germ would need both coatings if it were packed inside a missile warhead and then had to survive explosive decompression at its target, together with sudden exposure to sunlight.”
Such a coating is used in pharmaceuticals and functional animal feedstuffs, for example, to avoid the destruction by enzymes before reaching the target organ. A thesis written by Dr. Alibek’s assistant — who the directory from 2002 shows was a couple doors away from Ali Al-Timimi — says if silica was detected it would have been used for this purpose of encapsulation. The author, Dr. Crockett, also acknowledges the help of FBI’s Amerithrax consultant, William Patrick. There was more than one bioweapons thesis by an assistant to Dr. Alibek at GMU’s Center for Biodefense that thanked Dr. Patrick. The forensic finding set the respective squads off in alternative investigative directions. One squad focused on, for example, Hatfill, friend of William Patrick who might have learned a trick or two. Another squad focused on Al-Timimi, who also might have learned a trick or two from the same fount of knowledge — given he shared the same water fountain with Dr. Alibek and Dr. Bailey. In fact, curiously, it now appears that both Al-Timimi and Dr. Bailey worked at SRA International before GMU. Al-Timimi had a high security clearance for work with the Navy at SRA. See Milton Viorst, “The Education of Ali Al-Timimi.” I spoke to Ali’s wife, who is wonderful, but until and unless cleared by counsel, she is not able to discuss why Ali had a high security clearance for mathematical support work for the Navy while at SRA. Ayman’s requests to Atef had included publications not only on anthrax, but botulinum and plague. There is every reason to think that Abu Musab al-Suri’s web discussion of biological weapons stemmed from the book learning and networking that Zawahiri and Midhat Mursi were doing. p. The FBI's Masons In Charge Of Building A Case Is an Ivins Theory just a Stimulation exercise? Was the FBI merely caught off guard by Dr. Ivins' suicide -- and forced to improvise in a way that drew criticism from well-meaning critics. Was it deception in a national security matter used to generate leads? In considering the possibility, let's consider one of the masons that for a time was working to build a case. Michael Mason was in the Syracuse, New York office, when 2:15 a.m. one night, a 115,000-volt transmission tower came crashing down not far down the street from me. Mason investigated when the tower on the nearby Onondaga Indian reservation came 50 feet from landing on a cigarette shop, near where the local residents buy their smokes. “This is a serious felony. It is more than just criminal mischief,” Mason said. The Niagara Mohawk spokesperson declined to comment on what caused the tower to fall. But a local Onondaga businessman Oliver Hill said he knew. The tower missed crushing his cigarette shop by about 50 feet, which had been opened without the permission of the local Onondaga tribal leaders. “There has been sabotage on that tower because on each leg there are 20 to 30 bolts,” said Hill. “All the bolts were taken out on all four legs. So when the bolts are taken out, there’s nothing to hold it up so it fell over. Yes, it was sabotage.” I didn’t call the local FBI office about the tower incident. After all, smoking kills 400,000 people a year. Instead, I contacted the FBI office to tell them that a Ronald Reagan mask had been found along with a bank bag where the man lay in wait with a semi-automatic — first for my brother, and then the next week my father. A Ronald Reagan mask was the signature of a very dangerous bank robber known as the “Closing Time Bandit.” The FBI agent in the small local office, who did not identify himself, said something to the effect: “We killed the Closing Time Bandit who used a Ronald Reagan mask in robbing banks. So this guy can’t be responsible for those robberies.” Before moving on to Washington, D.C., Mason said his most memorable case was this “Closing Time Bandit” case. Not long before he was shot dead as 40 FBI agents surrounded him at Henrietta, New York, the robber had decorated his yard with balloons on his daughter’s birthday. Ronald Petersen had been killed Aug. 15, 1996 by FBI agents in the Rochester suburb of Henrietta while plotting another heist. The rightist, who had been tracked by a miniature television camera on a telephone pole outside his home, died in a hail of bullets. When police searched his house in Liverpool, a Syracuse suburb, they recovered 20 guns, including two Uzis, 20,000 rounds of ammunition and a cache of explosives. “I know. “ I told the agent, “This guy’s parole officer says his apartment in Watertown is covered with newspaper articles glorifying famous New York State criminals. He’s trying to make you fellows look foolish. By being a copycat and making it look like you killed the wrong guy.” The ex-convict and three-time loser who tried to take my Dad away at gunpoint that night before Christmas got 20+ years to life. Robbery was the apparent motive. That night, the police siren had come on within seconds of the 9/11 call coming in. The gunman spent the night holed up in a nearby garage and was captured after a psychiatrist/hostage negotiator came from Syracuse and talked him out of the garage. He asked that they kneel and pray together. (I never said the gunman, a former altar boy, was very bright). So why, as a liberal, am I such a booster of the FBI and local law enforcement? Because it is the FBI's job to protect and serve when some among us, overcome by anger and not being properly socialized, resort to hurting innocents, such as the elderly Mrs. Lundgren or the infant at ABC. It’s time to stop second-guessing them based on inadequate information and be supportive even if we might disagree with them. Mason was a friend in Syracuse of anti-war activist Kathleen Rumpf, who calls herself a “felon for peace” and is a staunch IANA supporter. She had been a personal hero of mine long before I met her based on positive comments I had heard. She spent several months in prison for trespassing during a demonstration against the School for the Americas at Fort Benning, Ga. She has worked for years fighting for prisoner rights and other issues. When Mason showed up there one of the first things he did was meet with her. “He’s quite wonderful,” Rumpf told the Sacramento Bee in an interview from the Syracuse offices of the American Civil Liberties Union. “He was incredibly responsible and treated me with great respect.” Mason says: “I’m not complicated enough to be political. It’s too hard.” As part of canvassing as part of a local political campaign, I was walking up a street in Syracuse in front of Kathleen Rumpf’s home on October 15, 2003 when my wife drove up, pointing out that the very short street had both Rumpf and the Berrigans (related to the late famed Catholic anti-nuclear pacifist). My time would be wasted urging them to vote for The Candidate. They were long-time family friends. I had been at a charity fundraiser when she ran merrily around the crowd — at the egging of one of the performers on stage — when the elder Berrigan spoke eloquently against the war in Iraq. The week before, on a crisp October morning, I had bought a bumper sticker from Barrie Gewanter, the local ACLU activist, at the Syracuse Festival of Races, who likely was advocating at the time on the IANA matter (I don’t recall specifically). I told her that I greatly admired her work and that reasonable people can disagree. The key, I said, to achieve the best balancing of interests was to have an informed debate. But when I know that people like Michael Mason are advising Director Mueller, I feel both secure and confident that authorities will always continue to strive to strike an appropriate balance. This is how this liberal could be not as concerned about the privacy rights, for example, associated with what people do when they use a computer at the library or use the Wayback Machine at the Internet Archive. I once crusaded (in a suit against AT&T) against what I argued was widespread illegal wiretapping by the local law enforcement authorities in some states such as Vermont. With the advent of digital wiretapping, the potential for abuse by a rogue wiretapper is huge and can be done by the person at his desk using a laptop Mason once gave a speech to 250 high school students gathered at the Syracuse University campus in 1998 for High School Press Day in which he explained to the students that it was important for both the FBI and the media not to rush to judgment. He drew parallels between the two professions, explaining that the most important characteristic in either profession is integrity. On another occasion, he spoke bluntly to young inmates and told them there were consequences to their actions. Another time he and the DA spoke to kids about violence at the request of area educators. One of his most baffling cases was a rash of thefts of two-way radios throughout the area. Mason realized the importance of catching a lucky break in a case. Once, in 1998, he had been working for 4 months trying to track down the 2 year old daughter who had been taken by a divorced father from the mother. He fruitlessly tracked leads that seemed to lead to Australia and London. Then one Saturday he went to work to collect his thoughts and plot a new strategy, when someone called from Montreal to describe the drunken boasting of the father in a bar in Montreal. Mason investigated teenage Animal Defense League members in connection with an attempted bombing incident at a local meat plant noting that the FBI was not targeting their beliefs, but their actions when those beliefs turned to violence. During his stay in Syracuse, his only apparent involvement in matters relating to radical islamists was to read of goings-on at the kitchen table in the morning. “Bomb focuses on radical cleric: Imprisoned sheik’s followers might have sent letter bombs,” investigators say,” Syracuse Herald-Journal, Jan. 4, 1997. Mason once described how a bank robbery was solved by discovering that the bank note had been written by a second grader. The bank robber handed a teller at the Marine Midland Bank a note demanding money on January 5, 1990. On the bottom half, police found part of a letter to a child signed by “Santa’s Helper.” Agents traced the letter to a second grade class at Franklin Elementary School, where the bank robber’s stepson attended. The FBI then was able to match the robber’s palm print to the note. Let’s hope Mason, while he was working Amerithrax, was working Saturdays — and has a SWAT Team at the ready (and a camera on the telephone pole outside) — and not hoping that a kid wrote the anthrax letters. How many does it take to monitor one person who needs to be closely surveilled according to Mason? As many as eight agents per shift if he is mobile. Another half-dozen to listen in on his calls. Others perhaps to file wiretap reports or handle aerial surveillance. A couple supervisory agents to oversee the case. $55 an hour for an agent. $150 for a plane. A lot more for electronic surveillance. In March 2004, Michael Mason explained to students gathered at his alma mater: “Our No. 1 job is disruption today. Now you have 100,000 pieces to a puzzle. Somebody has carted off all the box tops, and embedded inside those 100,000 pieces is a 20-piece picture of an event that you have to get out in front of and prevent before it happens while at the same time trying to preserve all the freedoms and liberties that we have come to embrace in this country.” He continued: “But we still have to do the job the right way. My job is to make sure that we do it the right way — that, in our zeal, we do not do anything that takes away from what defines us.” “If we lose confidence in our institutions, then we tear away at the very fabric that defines democracy. When you no longer trust the courts, the police, congressmen, senators, that’s the beginning of the end. That’s some of the most important work that we do.” Consider the example of a 35 year-old fellow named Mubarak, who was a friend of Murad, a key player in Bojinka. Mubarak lived with Murad before Murad had gone to the Philippines and plotted to blow up a bunch of airliners simultaneously. And, yes, Mubarak went to flight school. Agent Michael Mason, who headed the FBI’s Sacramento Office and then came to head Amerithrax, said “there were sufficient connections that necessitated his removal to another country.” “If he were a U.S. citizen, he might be walking around the [Sacramento] area today,” Mason said. “But .. inasmuch as his residency in this country was an issue, that just became another arrow in my quiver to neutralize the threat.” The same article also provides interesting examples of associates of the likes of 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi, Almidhar, and Hani Hanjour, the hijackers who followed the 911 imam Aulaqi to Falls Church. “What we have over the U.S. is a net,” Mason has said. “At best, what we’re doing is shrinking the mesh in the net. We’re trying to kick down the door of the person who’s going to drive the truck loaded with explosives. But can we do it in time?” When I told Agent Mason that I thought Zawahiri was behind the anthrax mailings, he responded by email that the FBI had not reached any conclusion but was leaving no stone unturned. Whenever the all-too-familiar refrain was invoked, some needed convincing. Bill Walter, retired microbiologist and former scientist in the U.S. bioweapon program who had not been contacted, once commented: “I read where they haven’t left a stone unturned. There’s about eight of us stones that are still unturned. It’s a joke.” Numerous illustrious legal beagles have been hard at work developing an entire new field of science that would stand up to a withering OJ-worthy scrutiny. The book MICROBIAL FORENSICS “describes the new and growing field of Microbial Forensics-the science that will help bring to justice criminals and terrorists who use biological material to cause harm. This book describes the foundation of the field of microbial forensics and will serve as a basic primer to initiate those scientists and officials that have an interest in the topic. It covers a variety of areas from forensic science, to microbiology, to epidemiology, to bioinformatics, and to legal issues.” Authors of the lead chapter “Microbial Forensics” include Bruce Budowie of the FBI Lab and James P. Burans. Burans was honored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation at a Washington, D.C. ceremony in 2002 for his help during the anthrax attacks. He was a scientific consultant to the FBI on the analysis of the mailed anthrax. The Federal Law Enforcement Officer’s Association also named Burans Civilian of the Year for his assistance. Names familiar to many who have followed Amerithrax closely include the author of “Bacterial Pathogens” Paul Keim, who has been part of FBI investigation working on the DNA sequencing of Ames and John Ezzell, author of the section on “Forensic handling of biological threat samples in the lab.” The most interesting chapter is “Non-DNA methods for biological signatures” with a raft of authors. “Population genetics of bacteria in a forensic context” may not pinpoint the lab, without more, but Paul Keim stands ready with co-author Richard E. Lenski to explain how it can narrow the field. Rounding out the text are articles reminiscent of OJ. Joseph M. Campos offers “Quality management in forensics laboratories.” Rock Harmon writes on “Admissibility standards for scientific evidence.” A former long-time Assistant District Attorney from California, Harmon helped develop the protocol to assist law enforcement agencies in solving previously unsolved cases through the use of DNA typing. Working for the Homeland Security Department (”HSD”), the Biosecurity and Nanosciences Laboratory has built a computer database of biological signatures, an approach that in Amerithrax is complementary to Keim’s PCR technique, which focuses on DNA signatures. (PCR means polymerase chain reaction.) A detector using PCR amplifies a short stretch of a pathogen’s DNA to determine its characteristics. Dr Yoreo’s lab characterize, for example, single spores of anthrax with high sensitivity. Internal newsletters indicate that the Lawrence Livermore was first enlisted to combat the Bin Laden anthrax threat in 1998 by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. And so although former FBI Lab Director Murch, who once played a key role in charting direction of DTRA research in 2001 and 2002 was quoted in a press account saying there is no “smoking gun” in Amerithrax, these young and talented folks at Lawrence Livermore keep looking. Life continues to be a grand mystery. Answers are seldom going to be found in a book or on a webpage. Okay, sometimes. next page | 
